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Under the context of neoliberal globalization, governments have pursued market-
driven economic reform policies and large firms have adopted the business model of short-
term profit maximization. In this context, intensification of labor polarization has 
produced growing concerns over the solidarity crisis faced by the labor movement in Korea, 
which reveals serious weaknesses in internal and external solidarity requiring rectification 
in order to overcome labor polarization. Internal solidarity of the labor movement in 
Korea has been weakened by union members’ attitude of self-interest toward job security 
and economic gain, by fragmented co-worker relations, and by intensified competition 
among activist factions for political power within unions. The most crucial factor 
constraining external solidarity of the Korean labor movement is the legacy of enterprise 
unionism, which has produced differentiated interest structures between organized and 
unorganized workers, while hindering the two worker groups from fostering a common 
ground of union activities and political vision. Reflexive leadership of labor movement, 
substantiation of industrial unionism, and fostering of communitarian activism are 
recommended for revitalizing labor solidarity.
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Introduction
The world of working people has become gloomier than ever. In contrast 
to the optimistic speculation of futurists, mega trends such as globalization, 
information society, and service economy have made the majority of working 
people around the globe experience worsening of employment conditions 
and sustained decline of decent jobs. In particular, neoliberal globalization, 
which has had a dominant influence on developed and developing economies 
over the past 30 years, has produced increasing discrepancy in wage income 
and decreased social protection for the working poor. To make matters 
worse, the global economic depression at present, triggered by the financial 
crisis of the U.S. economy, makes jobs and lives of the working people 
everywhere more vulnerable. 
Here, neoliberal globalization denotes that the globalizing tendency of 
integrating socio-economic activities across national territories has primarily 
been shaped by the discourse of market-driven deregulation policy 
originating from “the disembedded market liberalism” of the U.S. and the 
U.K. in the early 1980s. The neoliberal policy paradigm, coming to the fore 
against the background of the “inefficiency crisis” in the welfare states, 
became widespread through the conservative governments’ economic 
reforms in developed countries, and later diffused to developing economies 
under external pressure from international institutions (i.e., IMF and the 
World Bank). As Harvey (2005) and Bourdieu (1998) indicate, neoliberal 
globalization has forged “capital accumulation by dispossession” through the 
promotion of market-driven f lexibi l ity and dismantling of the 
institutionalized regime of social solidarity. As a consequence, it has 
intensified the inequality of economic earnings and segmentation of working 
life across and within countries.   
Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea), which is a success model of 
“compressed industrialization” among developing countries, has shown an 
exemplar trajectory over the past 10 years of socio-economic transformation 
influenced by neoliberal globalization. The 1997 economic crisis imposed 
IMF-driven neoliberal reforms, including flexibilization of the labor market 
as well as full-scale opening of product and capital markets throughout 
Korea. Furthermore, Korea’s labor regime was greatly impacted by extensive 
restructuring and massive downsizing in the public and private sectors. 
Despite the economic recovery after 1999, Korea has ever since been 
confronted with the crucial problem of labor polarization as clearly evinced 
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by a sharp increase in non-regular workforce and the widening disparity of 
employment conditions between regular (male) employees working for large 
firms and the remainder of the workforce. As a consequence, growing 
concern over “the crisis of labor solidarity or social justice” and “democracy 
without labor” in Korean society is the product of labor polarization (Lee 
2005; Choi 2005). In fact, labor polarization reflects the moral exclusion of 
non-regular laborers and workers at small- and medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs) from organizational and institutional protection, which exposes the 
developmental lag of social democracy in Korea’s political system by 
excluding representation of the interests of this marginalized working group 
(B. Lee 2008). Moreover, labor polarization engenders social disintegration as 
exemplified by a rapid rise in crime, suicide, and divorce, while eroding the 
sustainability of national economic growth. As such, labor polarization has 
been a destructive force undermining social solidarity of Korean society, 
which is propelled by neoliberal globalization over the past 10 years.  
This paper is to review the crucial issue of labor polarization in 
association with solidarity crisis in the Korean labor movement. The next 
section delineates the trends and driving forces of labor polarization since the 
1997 economic crisis. The third section diagnoses the problematic facets of 
the labor movement from the theoretical lens of solidarity. The last section 
concludes with some suggestions for revitalizing solidarity of labor 
movement in Korea. 
Trends and Driving Forces of Labor Polarization in Korea 
Korean economy became incorporated into neoliberal globalization 
since the economic crisis of 1997. Confronted with this economic crisis 
which came as a complete shock to the labor market in Korea, most Korean 
companies that had maintained the internal labor market policy of “life-time 
employment” in the pre-1997 era of sustained economic growth undertook 
extensive business restructuring and massive downsizing in an unprecedented 
manner. This resulted in fundamental changes in employment relations in 
the Korean labor market. According to a 2000 survey of listed corporations 
conducted by Korea Labor Institute (KLI), the percentage of companies that 
took action to downsize the number of employees during the period of this 
economic crisis is reported to be 66%, demonstrating how extensive 
corporate restructuring was at the time (Park and Roh 2001). The same 
survey shows that 74% of all responding companies created spin-offs and 
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57.6% outsourced part of their business. During the time of economic 
recovery in 1999, these companies recruited non-standard labor to fill 
positions formerly held by regular labor.
Korean labor market experienced a sharp rise in unemployment to 7% 
during the economic crisis and is witness to the decline of unemployment to 
3% since the economic recovery in the new millennium. However, the 
problem with the Korean labor market then was the worsening of 
employment structure, mainly derived from a sharp decline in desirable jobs 
and the widening disparity between desirable and undesirable jobs. Loss of 
desirable jobs at large firms was mainly due to management’s determined 
policy to carry out downsizing and outsourcing. The employment size of 
large firms with over 500 employees decreased from 2.1 million in 1993 to 1.3 
million in 2005. As a result, large-firm workforce declined from 17.2% to 
8.7% in the total wage-labor population during the same period (Kim 2005). 
On the other hand, the number of non-standard workers grew sharply after 
the economic crisis. Thus, excessive use of and discrimination against 
disposable employees has become a debatable issue in Korean society. As 
illustrated in figure 1, the percentage of non-regular employment has 
increased from 26.8% in 2001 to 35.9% in 2007 according to official 
government statistics, while labor unions estimate that the number has stayed 
between 55.7% and 54.2%.1 Nearly 90% of non-regular workers are employed 
at small firms with less than 300 employees. Moreover, a sustained reduction 
in the number of manufacturing jobs is associated with worsening job 
quality; between 1997 and 2007, the percentage of employment in the 
manufacturing sector dropped from 21.4% to 17.6%. These factors combined 
resulted in decreased middle-income jobs as shown in figure 2, thereby 
producing growing concern over labor polarization as well as the dismantling 
of the middle class in Korean society. 
Polarization of the labor market is evinced by the growing gap in overall 
employment conditions, including wages and fringe benefits, between the 
primary sector consisting of regular workers at large firms and the secondary 
sector consisting of regular workers at SMEs and non-regular employees. 
1 There have been intense debates on the size of non-regular workforce based on the Economic 
Active Population-Supplementary Survey conducted annually by the National Statistics Office since 
2000. The difference between the government’s statistics and labor union’s estimation is due to 
whether workers under recurrent renewal of temporary employment contract should be 
incorporated into the number of non-regular workforce. Labor unions insist that those workers 
should be categorized as non-regular labor, because they have insecure employment status and work 
under inferior working conditions like non-regular laborers.
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Figure 3 demonstrates the growing wage discrepancy between large and 
small firms from 1993 to 2006. For instance, monthly wages at small firms 
with 10-29 employees declined from 72.4% of in 1994 to 59.8% in 2006 in 
comparison to large firms with over 500 employees. Moreover, the wage gap 
between regular and non-regular workers has increased during recent years, 
to the point that monthly wages of non-regular workers have dropped from 
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Fig. 1. Trend of non-regular employment in Korea (KLI 2008; Kim 2007).
Government's estimationContingent Lebor Union's estimation
Fig. 2.  Changes in jobs by income earnings group between 1993 and 2004 (Chun et 
al. 2006).
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illustrated in figure 4.
Labor market polarization is also evident in workers’ fringe benefits and 
human resources development. Discrepancy in fringe benefits and training 
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Fig. 3.  Trend in monthly wage gap by firm size, with over 500 employees = 100 (B. 
Lee 2008). 
Fig. 4. Trend in monthly wage gap by employment status (Kim 2007).
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firms with over 1,000 employees expend twice more on fringe benefits and 
eight times more on training than small firms with 30-99 employees. Most 
non-regular workers are excluded from social welfare and labor standards. 
About 30% of these workers benefit from statutory welfare programs such as 
national pension, medical insurance, and employment insurance. Only 15%-
20% of non-standard workers are protected by statutory labor standards, 
including extra work premiums and severance pay. As a consequence, as 
shown in figure 5, the quality of employment among working people exhibits 
a “bi-polar” distribution, which demonstrates the polarized segmentation of 
labor market in Korea.2
An additional problem with polarized labor market is the lack of job 
mobility between primary and secondary sectors. Many studies have shown 
that non-regular jobs are traps rather than “stepping stones” to regular jobs 
because non-regular workers are entrapped in their marginal jobs rather than 
being able to move upward to regular positions (Nam and Kim 2000; Han 
and Jang 2000). The effect of segmented labor market structure is also 
identified in the school-to-work transition for youths with college degrees 
(Kim and Chun 2004). 
Labor polarization has not only aggravated income distribution in that 
both GINI coefficients and earnings dispersion, estimated by the relative 
2  The quality of employment is measured by combining 13 items covering provisions on social 
welfare, protection of statutory labor standards, and employment conditions in the Economic Active 
Population-Supplementary Survey.
 (Unit: %)
Fig. 5.  Distribution of quality of employment in the working population in 2007 (B. 
Lee 2008).
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ratio of the top 20% urban household income to the bottom 20% income 
households over the past 10 years, have increased as illustrated in figure 6, 
but it also produced growing concerns over social disintegration. In fact, 
divorce rate has soared from 59,300 in 1993 to 124,600, while suicide rate has 
increased from 1.06 million to 2.42 million in the same period. The number 
of heinous crimes grew annually by an average of 11.5% between 1997 and 
2004.  
Various factors have contributed to labor market polarization in Korea. 
The structural transformation of the Korean socio-economic system during 
the 1990s, and particularly in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 financial crisis, 
is associated with labor polarization. The wave of globalization that has 
infiltrated Korean economy has fortified the public discourse into justifying 
the “race-to-the-bottom” market competition and has hence created 
hegemonic dominance of “winner-take-all” mentality among the ruling elite 
and in the mass consciousness. Moreover, the advent of the service society 
and higher education of national manpower have spurred on individualization 
of working people and fragmented the organizational and psychological 
foundation of labor solidarity. Ironically, political democratization that has 
evolved since 1987 has led to intensification of social inequity by fostering 
domination of a new power bloc comprised of chaebols, bureaucracy, and 
conservative media equipped with neoliberal developmentalism in the era of 
globalization. The democratized state has been deprived of policy tools and 
Fig. 6. Trend in income inequity (KLI 2008).
GINI Coefficient Earnings dispersion
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the capacity to regulate economic segmentation between large leading firms 
and subcontracting SMEs under the context of deregulated open economy. 
Likewise, political democratization, which neutralizes the state’s authoritarian 
labor control policy, has led to increased discrepancy in employment 
conditions between organized and unorganized workers. Confronted with 
growing labor polarization since the economic crisis, Korea’s democratic 
government took a stance of market laissez-faire policy and has made little 
effort to resolve such societal problems as discrimination of non-regular 
employment and unfair business practices between large firms and SMEs. 
Under the context of changing political economy, large firms, particularly 
chaebols, have adopted an American-style business model for maximizing 
short-term profit, thereby resulting in the “trickle-down” effect in the 
national economy, to which they contributed in the era of the developmental 
state. Large leading firms have dispossessed SMEs by demanding that SMEs 
reduce recurrent subcontracting costs. They have also replaced regular 
employees with non-regular workers and reduced decent jobs through 
outsourcing.
Solidarity Crisis in Korea’s Labor Movement
Labor polarization has not only posed a crucial problem of economic 
inequity among working people, but it also undermines the foundation of 
solidarity for Korea’s labor movement. Korean labor movement developed the 
tradition of resistant solidarity to protect workers’ human rights from the 
authoritarian state’s labor control policy until 1987, and thus, it achieved 
explosive growth under the context of political democratization from the late 
1980s to the early 1990s (Kim 2008). It has been confronted with serious 
challenges arising from neoliberal globalization since the mid-1990s, 
however, particularly in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis. As 
exemplified by the growing trend of labor polarization, labor movement has 
been unable to cope with segmentation of working people which resulted 
from neoliberal restructuring led by the government and business groups 
over the past 10 years. Moreover, it is reduced to interest group unionism of 
protecting the interests of organized workers and of ignoring to represent the 
unorganized, thereby becoming victim to a “recruiting trap of organizational 
exclusion” (Zoll 2004) and being accountable for labor polarization to some 
extent. As a consequence, it now finds itself facing a “crisis of solidarity” (Lee 
2005).
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According to Zoll (2000), solidarity is conceptualized in terms of the 
following dual aspects: first is the capability of group members to behave as 
unified actors in relation to other members; second is the inter-dependence 
and coalition among different groups. In labor movement, the former implies 
internal solidarity among union members, while the latter connotes external 
solidarity with unorganized working people and other social movements. 
Internal labor solidarity is primarily based on an interest community and 
collective identity derived from the union members’ pursuit of identical 
interests and sharing of daily working experiences (Shelby 2002; Michels 
1962). This type of solidarity has been stressed by labor unions as an 
organizational unity for mobilizing power to pressure employers into 
accepting their demands. By contrast, external solidarity presumes different 
groups (i.e., regular and non-regular workers, or labor unions and NGOs) to 
bridge and cope with different interests and identity by building a common 
ground of political vision and mutual trust (Stjernø 2004; Hirsch 1986). 
Solidarity, internal as well as external, is the core source of labor unions’ 
power and social leverage; the former represents the extent of organizational 
cohesiveness and mobilization among union members while the latter 
signifies the degree of hegemonic force and societal legitimacy accredited to 
labor unions. A common and crucial precondition for fostering internal and 
external solidarity is reliable leadership for collective cohesion and strong 
relationships among organizational members and across different groups, 
effective communication for mutual understanding and shared framing, 
continuous contacts to nurture psychological ties and intimacy, and social 
norms to regulate the free-rider problem (Shelby 2002; Hodson et al. 1993; 
Hechter 1987; Jung 2003). In particular, external inter-group solidarity 
among different status groups requires group leaders’ political or ideological 
initiatives to promote collective altruism among privileged group members 
(Stjernø 2004; D’Art and Turner 2002). 
From a theoretical viewpoint of solidarity as outlined above, the labor 
movement in Korea reveals serious weaknesses in building internal and 
external solidarity for overcoming labor polarization. Korea’s labor union 
movement, which grew explosively in the aftermath of the 1987 
democratization movement and through which labor unions showed off 
militant mobilization that attracted worldwide attention in the 1990s through 
its exertion of societal influence, has now lost its organizational power. 
Decline of the labor movement is exemplified by the falling trend in union 
density from 18.6% in 1989 to 10.0% in 2006. Union members, particularly of 
large unions, were very active in abolishing militaristic shop floor control of 
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the pre-1987 era and in improving economic compensation and working 
conditions by partaking in union-led collective action until the early 1990s, 
but they became inactive in union activities since the mid-1990s as they 
enjoyed economic benefits gained through previous militant actions. During 
the 1997 economic crisis, union members saw their colleagues lose jobs due 
to massive downsizing, and their confidence in the organizational capacity 
and leadership of their unions to defend their jobs from employer-led lay-offs 
was shaken. Thus, they have since become more interested in preserving not 
only their own job security but also in economic gains to be made from 
collective bargaining to provide against future job loss. Under this context, 
intimacy on the shop floor among co-workers has transitioned to emotional 
detachment and organizational fragmentation. Moreover, union leadership, 
particularly at large firms, has often been weakened by intensified 
competition among activist factions to pursue political power within the 
union, which furthers union members’ indifference toward the labor 
movement. These factors have combined to damage the union’s internal 
solidarity-organizational cohesion and mobilizing capacity-over the past 10 
years. 
Labor movement in Korea has revealed a more crucial problem of 
external solidarity by being confronted with the growing trend in labor 
polarization between the organized at large firms and the unorganized at 
SMEs and non-regular employment. As of 2006, union density of the 
workforce employed by small firms with less than 30 employees is only 3.8%, 
and that of non-regular workforce is only 2.8% (Lee and Kwon 2008). By 
contrast, union density of the workforce employed by large firms with 300 or 
more employees is 35.5%. Given the minimal level of union representation of 
SMEs and non-regular workers, the two national centers—Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU)—have launched a number of campaigns for social reforms to 
protect unorganized labor force; they have also made efforts to organize 
them, but most of their efforts have been for naught. KCTU has put 
conscious effort into the organizational transformation toward industrial 
unionism since 1998, and has made 75.6% of its members affiliated with 
industrial unions. Industrial unions, however, have made little progress in 
representing or organizing these unorganized workers of SMEs and non-
regular employment, except a few success cases of the Korea Health and 
Medical Workers Union and the Korea Metal Workers Union.
The most crucial factor constraining external solidarity of Korean labor 
movement is the legacy of enterprise unionism. The enterprise union 
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structure, which was enforced by the military government in the early 1980s 
as a means to control and suppress organized labor, served as an 
organizational foundation to mobilize en masse right after the Great Workers’ 
Struggle of 1987. In the 1990s, many enterprise unions effectively built 
internal solidarity against employers and the government by organizing 
collective action to improve working conditions at the workplace and by 
calling for general strikes to protest against Korean government’s anti-labor 
policies. However, enterprise unionism has become a trap that has been 
constraining external solidarity of the labor movement since the 1997 
economic crisis. Enterprise unions at large firms, with the power to pressure 
employers into making concessions, have since been able to provide 
economic advantages and job security for their members, thereby creating a 
differentiated interest structure between them and the unorganized workers. 
Enterprise unionism tends to focus on the self-interests of the insiders (union 
members) within the boundary of the enterprise and to exclude the interests 
of the unorganized outsiders. In addition to the differentiated interest 
structure, enterprise unionism hinders organized and unorganized workers 
from fostering a common ground for union activities and political vision. 
Furthermore, union members at large firms have morally excluded non-
regular workers from union representation and have enforced status 
distinction between the two groups (Lee 2005). This could be seen as an 
outcome of the employers’ strategy of divide-and-rule to foster labor-
management accommodation at large firms. Although many enterprise 
unions at large firms were transformed into affiliated units of industrial 
unions, the self-interested legacy of enterprise unionism largely remains 
intact as it is. Leaders of national centers and industrial unions have stressed 
external solidarity for protecting and organizing SMEs and non-regular 
workers, but their efforts have been futile more often than not due to 
indifference and non-cooperation of enterprise unions or enterprise units in 
control of a substantial portion of organizational resources. The self-
interested legacy of enterprise unionism has led labor movement to be 
viewed as demoralized egoistic interest groups in public discourses and an 
undesirable condition for organizing prospective members. The national 
centers (and sometimes individual unions) have tried to build a solidarity 
front with NGO groups, but those activities have often ended as tactically 
transient coalition attempts. 
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Conclusion
Under the context of neoliberal globalization, governments of many 
countries have pursued market-driven economic reform policies, and firms 
have adopted the business model of short-term profit maximization. In this 
context, intensified labor polarization is common in most industrial societies 
as observed in the growing discrepancy of economic compensation and 
employment conditions between organized and unorganized workers. The 
driving force behind labor polarization comes chiefly from neoliberal 
globalization and market-driven deregulation and restructuring undertaken 
by governments and employers during the past 30 years. However, labor 
unions are not unrelated to generating labor polarization. Labor unions in 
most countries have lost their organizational power and cohesiveness, 
exemplified by declining membership and differentiated interests of union 
members, and hence, experienced the deterioration of their class 
representativeness and societal voice as a result of narrowly focusing on 
activities to protect members’ interests and their inability to cope with labor 
polarization. As a consequence, labor union movements in many industrial 
societies are confronted with solidarity crisis. Korean labor movement is not 
an exception; rather, it is an exemplar case. Korean labor unions, which have 
been known for their militant activism to gain socio-economic reforms for 
the working class since the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, are now showing 
crucial problems of fragmented and self-interested membership as well as 
exclusionary attitudes toward unorganized irregular workers. As such, Korea’s 
labor movement has been inactive and incapable of securing solidarity of all 
of the working class because it is undermined by neoliberal restructuring led 
jointly by the government and businesses.    
Revitalization of solidarity in the labor movement is a key precondition 
to coping with labor polarization. Several suggestions can be made for 
rebuilding solidarity in the labor movement in general and in Korea in 
particular. First, revitalization of solidarity can start with reflexive leadership 
of labor movement. In order to rebuild internal solidarity (members’ unity) 
within labor unions to overcome individualized interests, new union 
leadership must restore communitarian consciousness of the members by 
developing and activating reflexive discourse to replace entrenched neoliberal 
orientation of the logic of race-to-the-bottom competition and free-riding 
norms. Furthermore, new leadership is required to make conscious efforts to 
overcome a differentiated interest structure in order to forge external 
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solidarity between organized and unorganized workers. New leadership 
should also regain the confidence of union members and the unorganized in 
labor movement in order to achieve organizational integration and expansion 
by developing viable strategies to “win” the contest against employers and the 
government.
Second, substantiation of industrial unionism with political vision and 
active praxis of solidarity is necessary for overcoming the legacy of enterprise 
unionism, which has shaped the narrow-minded interests of union members 
and has segmented the social relations of the organized and unorganized. As 
Zoll (2000) indicates, industrial unionism should be built on “organic 
solidarity” to embrace varied interests among the workforce from different 
sectors and employment status rather than resorting to “mechanistic 
solidarity” based on identical interests, upon which enterprise unionism has 
been based.         
Third, in order to fortify external solidarity, the labor movement needs 
to focus on fostering community-based activism that promotes common 
grounds for psychological ties and social intimacy; as well, a differentiated 
interest structure must be transcended beyond the enterprise boundary. 
Social network of intimacy in community activism could be fostered by a 
variety of communal activities, including workers’ families and local NGOs, 
aimed at transforming workers’ individualized lifestyle into collective identity 
and culture. Moreover, it is important to make conscious effort to 
institutionalize the norms of solidarity for de-marketizing co-worker 
relations in the realm of daily life inside as well as outside the shop floor.     
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